Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - 1973 Yom Kippur War
The Yom Kippur War
(Hebrew: מלחמת יום הכיפורים; transliterated: Milhemet Yom HaKipurim;
Arabic: حرب أكتوبر; transliterated: Harb October or حرب تشرين
transliterated: Harb Tishrin), also known as the October War, the 1973
Arab-Israeli War, and the Ramadan War, was fought from October 6 (the
day of Yom Kippur) to October 24, 1973, between Israel and a coalition
of Egypt and Syria. The War began when Egypt and Syria launched a
surprise joint attack in the Sinai and Golan Heights, respectively, both
of which had been captured by Israel during the Six-Day War six years
earlier.
The Egyptians and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after
which momentum began to swing in Israel's favor. By the second week of
the war, the Syrians had been pushed entirely out of the Golan Heights.
In the Sinai to the south, the Israelis had struck at the "hinge"
between two invading Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal (where the
old cease-fire line had been), and cut off an entire Egyptian army just
as a United Nations cease-fire came into effect.
The war had far-reaching implications for many nations. The Arab world,
which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the
Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day War, felt
psychologically vindicated by its string of victories early in the
conflict. This vindication paved the way for the peace process that
followed, as well as liberalizations such as Egypt's infitah policy. The
Camp David Accords which came soon after led to normalized relations
between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had recognized
the Israeli state. Egypt, which had already been drifting away from the
Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence almost entirely.
Background
Causes
This war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which has
included many battles and wars since 1948. During the Six-Day War six
years earlier, the Israelis had captured the Sinai clear to the Suez
Canal, which had become the cease-fire line. The Israelis had also
captured roughly half of the Golan Heights from Syria.
In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification
in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971 Israel spent $500
million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of
fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named
after Israeli General Haim Bar-Lev. After the war that defeated the
Egyptian and Syrian armies in 1967, and having emerged undefeated from
the three-year-long War of Attrition with Egypt in the south and several
border incidents with Syria in the north, the Israeli leadership had
grown somewhat complacent.
Both Arab countries desired a return of the territories lost in the 1967
war. After the success of the Six-Day War the Israeli leadership was
reluctant to enter into negotiations over returning these territories,
feeling that they were militarily secure. President Gamal Abdel Nasser
of Egypt died in September 1970. He was succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who
resolved to fight Israel and win back the territory lost in the Six-Day
War. In 1971, Sadat, in response to an initiative by UN intermediary
Gunnar Jarring, declared that if Israel committed itself to "withdrawal
of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip" and to implementation
of other provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as requested
by Jarring, Egypt would then "be ready to enter into a peace agreement
with Israel." Israel responded that it would not withdraw to the
pre-June 5, 1967, lines.[1]
Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis,
the status quo could be altered. Hafiz al-Assad, the head of Syria, had
a different view. He had little interest in negotiation and felt the
retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since
the Six-Day War, Assad had launched a massive military build up and
hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states. With
the aid of Egypt, Assad felt that his new army could win convincingly
against the Israeli army and thus secure Syria's role in the region.
Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan Heights had been
retaken by force, which would induce Israel to give up the West Bank and
Gaza, and make other concessions.
Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three
years since Sadat had taken office... were the most demoralized in
Egyptian history... A desiccated economy added to the nation's
despondency. War was a desperate option." (Rabinovich, 13). In his
biography of Sadat, Raphael Israeli argued that Sadat felt the root of
the problem was in the great shame over the Six-Day War, and before any
reforms could be introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome.
Egypt's economy was in shambles, but Sadat knew that the deep reforms
that he felt were needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the
population. A military victory would give him the popularity he needed
to make changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently
university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war
to reclaim the Sinai and were highly upset that Sadat had not launched
one in his first three years in office.
The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a
new war. King Hussein of Jordan feared another major loss of territory
as had occurred in the Six-Day War, during which Jordan was halved in
population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the
territories (West Bank and Gaza) and in the event of a victory promised
Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw
the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom.
Moreover, during the Black September crisis of 1970 a near civil war had
broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that war
Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, leaving Assad
and Hussein estranged.
Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to
join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel,
was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and
already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage
in a diplomatic offensive to try to win support for the war. By the fall
of 1973 he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states. These were
most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement, and
Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to curry favour in
Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and France had for
the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel on the United
Nations Security Council. In the lead up to the war West Germany became
one of Egypt's largest sources of materiel.
Events leading up to the War
Anwar Sadat in 1972 publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going to
war with Israel, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one million
Egyptian soldiers." From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated
effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-23s, SA-6s, RPG-7s and
especially the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet
Union and improving its military tactics. Political generals, who had in
large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with
competent ones.
The role of the great powers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of
the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of
Egypt's military weakness. While the U.S. and other allied nations
supplied Israel with the most up-to-date assault weapons in the world,
the Russians supplied Egypt only with defense weaponry, and then only
with great reluctance. Indeed, President Nasser was only able to obtain
the material for an anti-aircraft missile defense wall after having
visited Moscow and pleaded with the Kremlin leaders. He claimed that if
supplies were not given, he would have to return to Egypt and tell the
Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them, and then relinquish power to
one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans. The
Americans would then have the upper hand in the region, which Moscow
could not permit.
One of Egypt's undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to
force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and war
materiel. It was felt that the only way to convince the Soviet leaders
of the deficiencies of most of the aircraft and air defense weaponry
they had supplied to Egypt following 1967 was to put them to the test
against the advanced weaponry which the U.S. had supplied to Israel.
Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the
Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to push Egypt towards a peaceful
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At all costs they wanted to avoid
a new conflagration between the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn
into a confrontation with the United States. The reality of the
situation became apparent when the superpowers met in Oslo and agreed to
maintain the status quo. This was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders, and
when it was discovered that the Egyptian preparations for crossing the
canal were being leaked, it became imperative to expel the Russians from
Egypt. In July 1972 Sadat expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet
military advisors in the country and reoriented the country's foreign
policy to be more favourable to the United States.
The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned
that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez would incur massive
losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing Detente, had no interest in
seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting between U.S.
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, Brezhnev had
proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if
Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation
from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to
restrain Sadat's plans. (Rabinovich, 39)
In an interview published in Newsweek (April 9, 1973), President Sadat
again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab forces
conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on the
highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The
Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the
Israeli Air Force would be able to repel it.
Almost a full year before the war, in an October 24, 1972, meeting with
his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to
go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support (Rabinovich,
25). Planning was done in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon
commanders were not told of war plans until less than a week prior to
the attack, and the soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand.
The plan to attack Israel in concert with Syria was code-named Operation
Badr (the Arabic word for "full moon").
Lead up to the surprise attack
The IDF's Aman (Military Intelligence), "the leader of Israel's
intelligence community," was responsible for formulating the nation's
intelligence estimate (Rabinovich, 22). Their assessments on the
likelihood of war were based on several assumptions. First, it was
assumed correctly that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless
Egypt went to war as well. Second, they learned from a high-ranking
Egyptian informant (who to-this-day remains confidential, known only as
"The Source") that Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would
not go to war until the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers
to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used
against Israeli cities as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on
Egyptian infrastructure. Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the
fighter bombers, and the Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late
August (it would take 4 months to train the Egyptian ground crews), Aman
predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about Egypt's
strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly colored their thinking
and led them to dismiss other war warnings.
The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis
and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military
observers had severely hurt the army. The Egyptians ensured that there
was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems and
a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The
Egyptians made repeated reports on a non-existent lack of spare parts
that also made their way to Israel. Sadat had long engaged in
brinkmanship. Sadat had so frequently stated that the war would soon
resume that the world ignored such declarations. In May and August 1973
the Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border. Both times the
Israeli army had mobilized at the cost of some $10 million dollars.
For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long
training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence,
detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed them as
more training exercises. Movement of Syrian troops towards the border
was puzzling, but not a threat because, Aman believed, they would not
attack without Egypt and Egypt would not attack until the Soviet
weaponry arrived.
Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with
Sadat and [Syrian President] Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given
the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely
that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that
Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more
general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in"
(Rabinovich, 51). On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to
Tel Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending
Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs.
Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would
cooperate'". (Rabinovich, 50) Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf
ears. Aman concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not
already know. "Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during
September from well placed sources. But [Mossad chief] Zvi Zamir
continued to insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's
warnings succeeded in stirring his doubts" (Rabinovich, 56). He would
later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of War]"
(Rabinovich, 57).
Finally, Zvi Zamir personally went to Europe to meet with The Source
(the high-ranking Egyptian official), at midnight on October 5th/6th. At
that meeting, the source informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian
attack on Israel was imminent. It was this warning in particular,
combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded
the Israeli high command into action. Just hours before the attack
began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.[2]
Ironically, calling up the reserves proved to be easier than usual, as
almost all of the troops were at synagogue or at home for the holiday.
Lack of an Israeli Pre-emptive attack
Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that if
war was imminent, Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was
assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst
case, about 48 hours' notice prior to an Arab attack.
Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Israeli general David Elazar met at 8:05 AM
the morning of Yom Kippur, 6 hours before the war was to begin. Dayan
began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar then
presented his argument, in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian
airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 PM, and Syrian ground forces
at 5:00 PM. "When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed
uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There
would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American
assistance soon and it was imperative that it not be blamed for starting
the war. "If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody", she said"
(Rabinovich, 89). European nations, under threat of an Arab oil embargo
and trade boycott, had stopped supplying Israel with munitions. As a
result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States to resupply
its army, and was particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger
that relationship.
In retrospect, the decision not to strike first was a sound one.
Operation Nickel Grass, the American airlift of supplies during the war
which began on October 13, while it did not immediately replace Israel's
losses in equipment, did allow it to expend what it did have more freely
(Rabinovich, 491). Had they struck first, according to Henry Kissinger,
they would not have received "so much as a nail".
The War
In the Sinai
The Egyptian units would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of
losing protection of their SAM missile batteries. In the Six-Day War,
the Israeli Air Force had pummelled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt
(and Syria) had heavily fortified their side of the cease-fire lines
with SAM batteries, against which the Israeli Air Force had no effective
countermeasures. Israel, which had invested much of its defense budget
building the region's strongest air force, would see its air force
rendered almost useless by the presence of the SAM batteries.
Anticipating a swift Israeli armored counterattack, the Egyptians had
armed their first wave with unprecedented numbers of tank-destroying
weapons—Rocket propelled grenades and the more devastating Sagger
missiles. One in every three Egyptian soldiers had an anti-tank weapon.
"Never before had such intensive anti-tank fire been brought to bear on
the battlefield" (Rabinovich, 108). In addition, the ramp on the
Egyptian side of the canal had been increased to twice the height of the
Israeli ramp, giving them an excellent vantage point from which to fire
down on the Israelis, as well as any approaching tanks.
The Egyptian army surprised many by breaching the Israeli defenses and
quickly crossing the Suez Canal in what became known as The Crossing,
reducing all but one of the Bar-Lev forts. In a meticulously rehearsed
operation, the Egyptian forces advanced approximately 15 km into the
Sinai desert with the combined forces of two army corps. The Israelis
had set up defensive positions behind huge sand berms on the east bank
of the canal, which experience taught them would be nearly impervious to
bombing or artillery attack. However, Egyptian military engineers came
up with an ingenious plan—attacking the berms with water cannon, fed
directly from the canal. The berms disintegrated under water pressure,
leaving the Israeli defensive positions exposed.
The troops garrisoning the Bar-Lev forts, outnumbered by orders of
magnitude, were overwhelmed. Only one, Budapest (the northernmost
Bar-Lev fort) would remain in Israeli control through the end of the
war.
The Egyptian forces consolidated their initial positions. On October 8,
Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front—who had only taken
the position 3 months before at the retirement of Ariel Sharon—ordered a
counterattack by Gabi Amir's brigade against entrenched Egyptian forces
at Hizayon, where approaching tanks could be easily destroyed by Saggers
fired from the Egyptian ramp. Despite Amir's reluctance, the attack
proceeded, and the result was a disaster. Towards nightfall, a
counterattack by the Egyptians was stopped by Ariel Sharon's
division—Sharon had been reinstated as a division commander at the
outset of the war. The fighting lulled, with neither side wanting to
mount a large attack against the other.
Following the disastrous Israeli attack on the 8th, both sides settled
into defensive postures and hoped for the other side to attack
(Rabinovich, 353). Elazar replaced Gonen, who had proven
out-of-his-league, with Haim Bar-Lev, who had come out of retirement.
Because it was considered dangerous to morale to replace the front
commander during the middle of a battle, rather than being sacked Gonen
was made chief-of-staff to the newly appointed Bar-Lev.
After several days of waiting, Sadat, wanting to ease pressure on the
Syrians, ordered his chief generals (Saad El Shazly and Ahmad Ismail Ali
chief among them) to attack. The Egyptian forces brought across their
reserves and began their counterattack on 14 October. "The attack, the
most massive since the initial Egyptian assault on Yom Kippur, was a
total failure, the first major Egyptian reversal of the war. Instead of
concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the wadi thrust, they
had expended them in head-on attack against the waiting Israeli
brigades. Egyptian losses for the day were estimated at between 150 and
250 tanks" (Rabinovich, 355)
The following day, October 15, the Israelis launched Operation
Stouthearted Men—the counterattack against the Egyptians and crossing of
the Suez Canal. The attack was a tremendous change of tactics for the
Israelis, who had previously relied on air and tank support—support that
had been decimated by the well-prepared Egyptian forces. Instead, the
Israelis used infantry to infiltrate the positions of the Egyptian SAM
and anti-tank batteries, which were unable to cope as well with forces
on foot. A division led by Major General Ariel Sharon attacked the
Egyptian line just north of Bitter Lake, in the vicinity of Ismailiya.
The Israelis struck at a weak point in the Egyptian line, the "seam"
between the Egyptian second Army in the north and the Egyptian third
Army in the south. In some of the most brutal fighting of the war in and
around the Chinese Farm (an irrigation project east of the canal and
north of the crossing point), the Israelis opened a hole in the Egyptian
line and reached the Suez Canal. A small force crossed the canal and
created a bridgehead on the other side. For over 24 hours, troops were
ferried across the canal in light inflatable boats, with no armor
support of their own. They were well supplied with American-made M72 LAW
missiles, negating the threat of Egyptian armor. Once the anti-aircraft
and anti-tank defences of the Egyptians had been neutralized, the
infantry once again was able to rely on overwhelming tank and air
support.
Prior to the war, fearing an Israeli crossing of the canal, no Western
nation would supply the Israelis with bridging equipment. They were able
to purchase modular, pontoon bridging equipment from a French scrap lot.
Deploying the pontoon bridge on the night of October 16/17, Avraham
"Bren" Adan's division crossed and raced south, intent on cutting off
the Egyptian third Army before it could retreat west back into Egypt. At
the same time, it sent out raiding forces to destroy Egyptian SAM
missile batteries east of the canal. (Before the war ended, the Israelis
were within 101 kilometers of Cairo, Egypt's capital.)
On the Golan Heights
In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two
brigades and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions and 188
batteries. At the onset of the battle, approximately 180 Israeli tanks
faced off against approximately 1,400 Syrian tanks. Despite the
overwhelming odds and the fact that most of the Syrian tanks were
equipped with night-fighting equipment, every Israeli tank deployed on
the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Syrian
commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli
stronghold at Jabal al Shaikh (Mount Hermon), which had a variety of
surveillance equipment.
Fighting in the Golan Heights was given priority by the Israeli High
Command. The fighting in the Sinai was sufficiently far away that Israel
was not immediately threatened; should the Golan Heights fall, the
Syrians could easily advance into Israel itself, although they did not
plan to. Reservists were directed to the Golan as quickly as possible.
They were assigned to tanks and sent to the front as soon as they
arrived at army depots, without waiting for the crewman they trained
with to arrive; without waiting for machine guns to be installed on
their tanks, and without taking the time to calibrate their tank guns (a
time-consuming process known as boring).
As in the Sinai, on the Golan Heights, the Syrians took care to stay
under cover of their SAM missile batteries. Also as in the Sinai, the
Syrians made use of Soviet anti-tank weapons (which, because of the
uneven terrain, were not as effective as in the flat Sinai desert).
The Syrians had expected it would take at least 24 hours for Israeli
reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, Israeli reserve units began
reaching the battle lines only fifteen hours after the war began.
By the end of the first day of battle, the Syrians (who at the start
outnumbered the Israelis in the Golan 9 to 1) had achieved moderate
success. Towards the end of the day, "A Syrian tank brigade passing
through the Rafid Gap turned northwest up a little-used route known as
the Tapline Road, which cut diagonally across the Golan. This roadway
would prove one of the main strategic hinges of the battle. It led
straight from the main Syrian breakthrough points to Nafekh, which was
not only the location of Israeli divisional headquarters but the most
important crossroads on the Heights."[3] During the night, Lieutenant
Zvika Greengold, who had just arrived to the battle unattached to any
unit, fought them off with his single tank until help arrived. "For the
next 20 hours, Zvika Force, as he came to be known on the radio net,
fought running battles with Syrian tanks—sometimes alone, sometimes as
part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were
knocked out. He was wounded and burned but stayed in action and
repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected direction to
change the course of a skirmish."
Over four days of fighting, the 7th Israeli brigade in the north
(commanded by Yanush Ben Gal) managed to hold the rocky hill line
defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah. To the
south, however, the "Barak" brigade, bereft of any natural defenses,
began to take on heavy casualties. Commander Colonel Shoham was killed
during the first few days of fighting, as the Syrians desperately tried
to push inwards towards the Sea of Galilee.
The tide in the Golan turned as the arriving Israeli reserve forces were
able to contain and, starting 8 October, push back the Syrian offensive.
The tiny Golan Heights was too small to act as an effective territorial
buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south, but it proved to be a
strategic geographical stronghold and was a crucial key in preventing
the Syrian army from bombing the cities below. By Wednesday, October 10,
the last Syrian unit in the Central sector had been pushed back across
the purple line (the pre-war border). (Rabinovich, 302)
A decision now had to be made—whether to ease the fighting down and end
the war at the 1967 border, or to continue the war into Syrian
territory. Israeli High Command spent the whole of October 10 debating
this, well into the night. Some favored disengagement, which would allow
soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai (Shmuel Gonen's ignominious
defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had happened two days before). Others
favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards Damascus, which would
knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore Israel's image as the
supreme military power in the Middle East and would give them a valuable
bargaining chip once the war ended. Others countered that Syria had
strong defenses—antitank ditches, minefields, and strongpoints—and that
it would be better to fight from defensive positions in the Golan
Heights (rather than the flat terrain of Syria) in the event of another
war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Meir realized the most crucial
point of the whole debate—"It would take four days to shift a division
to the Sinai. If the war ended during this period, the war would end
with a territorial loss for Israel in the Sinai and no gain in the
north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a political matter and her
decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple line... The attack would
be launched tomorrow, Thursday, October 11" (Rabinovich, 304)
From 11 October to 14 October, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria,
conquering a further twenty-square-mile box of territory in the Bashan.
From there they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only 40 km
away, using heavy artillery.
"As Arab position on the battlefields deteriorated, pressure mounted on
King Hussein to send his Army into action. He found a way to meet these
demands without opening his kingdom to Israeli air attack. Instead of
attacking Israel from their common border, he sent an expeditionary
force into Syria. He let Israel know of his intentions, through U.S.
intermediaries, in the hope that it [Israel] would accept that this was
not a casus belli justifying an attack into Jordan... Dayan declined to
offer any such assurance, but Israel had no intention of opening another
front" (Rabinovich, 433). Iraq also sent an expeditionary force to the
Golan, consisting of some 30,000 men, 500 tanks, and 700 APCs.
(Rabinovich, 314).
Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any
further Israeli gains.
On 22 October, the Golani Brigade recaptured the outpost on Mount
Hermon, after sustaining very heavy casualties from entrenched Syrian
snipers strategically positioned on the mountain. An attack two weeks
before had cost 25 dead and 67 wounded, while this second attack cost an
additional 55 dead and 79 wounded (Rabinovich, 450). An Israeli D9
bulldozer with Israeli infantry breached a way to the peak, preventing
the peak from falling into Syrian hands after the war. A paratrooper
brigade took the corresponding Syrian outposts on the mountain.
At sea
The Battle of Latakia, a revolutionary naval battle between the Syrians
and the Israelis, took place on October 7, the second day of the war,
resulting in a resounding Israeli victory that proved the potency of
small, fast missile boats equipped with advanced ECM packages. The
battle also established the Israeli Navy, long derided as the "black
sheep" of the Israeli services, as a formidable and effective force in
its own right.
Several other times during the War, the Israeli navy mounted small
commando-style raids on Egyptian ports. The purpose of these raids was
to destroy boats that were to be used by the Egyptians to ferry their
own commandos behind Israeli lines.
Participation by other Arab states
Besides Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, many other Arab nations were
involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. Exact
amounts of support are uncertain.
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave financial aid and sent some token forces to
join in the battle. Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines; the
Palestinians sent troops as well. (Rabinovich, 464). Pakistan sent
sixteen pilots.
From 1971 to 1973, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya sent Mirage fighters and
gave Egypt around $1 billion to arm for war. Algeria sent squadrons of
fighters and bombers, armored brigades, and dozens of tanks. Tunisia
sent over 1,000 soldiers, who worked with Egyptian forces in the Nile
delta, and Sudan sent 3,500 soldiers. Uganda radio reported that Idi
Amin sent Ugandan soldiers to fight as well.Citation needed
The cease-fire and immediate aftermath
Egypt's trapped Third Army
The United Nations passed a cease-fire, largely negotiated between the
U.S. and Soviet Union, on October 22. It called for an end to the
fighting between Israel and Egypt (but technically not between Syria and
Israel). It came into effect 12 hours later at 6:52 PM Israeli time.
(Rabinovich, 452). Because it went into effect after darkness, it was
impossible for satellite surveillance to determine where the front lines
were when the fighting was supposed to stop. (Rabinovich, 458)
When the cease-fire began, the Israeli forces were just a few hundred
meters short of their goal—the last road linking Cairo and Suez. During
the night, the Egyptians broke the cease-fire in a number of locations,
destroying nine Israeli tanks. In response, David Elazar requested
permission to resume the drive south, and Moshe Dayan approved.
(Rabinovich, 463) The Israeli troops finished the drive south, captured
the road, and trapped the Egyptian Third Army west of the Suez Canal.
The next morning, October 23, a flurry of diplomatic activity occurred.
Soviet reconnaissance flights had confirmed that Israeli forces were
moving south, and the Soviets accused the Israelis of treachery. In a
phone call with Golda Meir, Henry Kissinger asked, "how can anyone ever
know where a line is or was in the desert?" Meir responded, "they'll
know, all right." Kissinger found out shortly later about the trapped
Egyptian army. (Rabinovich, 465).
Kissinger realized the situation presented the United States with a
tremendous opportunity—Egypt was totally dependent on the United States
to prevent Israel from destroying its trapped army, which now had no
access to food or water. The position could be parlayed later into
allowing the United States to mediate the dispute, and push Egypt out of
Soviet influences.
"[Kissinger] had pushed Israel during the war to strike hard—harder, in
fact, than it had initially been able to—in order to demonstrate its
military superiority. But once the Israelis had begun smiting the
Egyptians, he worked towards a speedy cease-fire that would leave the
Egyptians with their dignity intact. Israel, in short, was to emerge
quasi-victorious, not triumphant" (Rabinovich, 486)
As a result, the United States exerted tremendous pressure on the
Israelis to refrain from destroying the trapped army, even threatening
to support a UN resolution to force the Israelis to pull back to their
October 22 positions if they did not allow non-military supplies to
reach the army. In a phone call with Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz,
Kissinger told the ambassador that the destruction of the Egyptian Third
Army "is an option that does not exist" (Rabinovich, 487).
Nuclear alert
In the meantime, Brezhnev sent Nixon a letter in the middle of the night
of October 23–24. In that letter, Brezhnev proposed that American and
Soviet contingents be dispatched to ensure both sides honor the
cease-fire. He also threatened that "I will say it straight that if you
find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be
faced with the necessity urgently to consider taking appropriate steps
unilaterally. We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel"
(Rabinovich, 479). In short, the Soviets were threatening to intervene
in the war on Egypt's side.
The message arrived after Nixon had gone to bed. Kissinger immediately
called a meeting of senior officials, including Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger, CIA Director William Colby, and White House Chief of Staff
Alexander Haig. The Watergate scandal had reached its apex, and Nixon
was so agitated and discomposed that they decided to handle the matter
without him:
"When Kissinger asked Haig whether [Nixon] should be wakened, the White
House chief of staff replied firmly 'No.' Haig clearly shared
Kissinger's feelings that Nixon was in no shape to make weighty
decisions" (Rabinovich, 480).
The meeting produced a conciliatory response, which was sent (in Nixon's
name) to Brezhnev. At the same time, it was decided to increase the
Defense Condition (DEFCON) from four to three, the highest peacetime
level. Lastly, they approved a message to Sadat (again, in Nixon's name)
asking him to drop his request for Soviet assistance, and threatening
that if the Soviets were to intervene, so would the United States.
(Rabinovich, 480)
The Soviets quickly detected the increased American defense condition,
and were astonished and bewildered at the response. "Who could have
imagined the Americans would be so easily frightened," said Nikolai
Podgorny. "It is not reasonable to become engaged in a war with the
United States because of Egypt and Syria," said KGB chief Alexei
Kosygin, while Yuri Andropov added that "We shall not unleash the Third
World War" (Rabinovich, 484). In the end, the Soviets reconciled
themselves to an Arab defeat. The letter from the American cabinet
arrived during the meeting. Brezhnev decided that the Americans were too
nervous, and that the best course of action would be to wait to reply.
(Rabinovich, 485) The next morning, the Egyptians agreed to the American
suggestion, and dropped their request for assistance from the Soviets,
bringing the crisis to an end.
Northern front de-escalation
On the northern front, the Syrians had been preparing for a massive
counter-attack, scheduled for October 23. In addition to Syria's five
divisions, Iraq had supplied two, and there were smaller compliments of
troops from other Arab countries, including Jordan. The Soviets had
replaced most of the losses Syria's tank forces had suffered during the
first weeks of the war.
However, the day before the offensive was to begin, the United Nations
imposed its cease-fire (following the acquiescence of both Israel and
Egypt). "The acceptance by Egypt of the cease-fire on Monday [October
22] created a major dilemma for Assad. The cease-fire did not bind him,
but its implications could not be ignored. Some on the Syrian General
Staff favored going ahead with the attack, arguing that if it did so
Egypt would feel obliged to continue fighting as well... Others,
however, argued that continuation of the war would legitimize Israel's
efforts to destroy the Egyptian Third Army. In that case, Egypt would
not come to Syria's assistance when Israel turned its full might
northward, destroying Syria's infrastructure and perhaps attacking
Damascus" (Rabinovich, 464-465)
Ultimately, Assad decided to call off the offensive, and on October 23,
Syria announced it had accepted the cease-fire, and the Iraqi government
ordered its forces home.
Post-cease-fire negotiations
Organized fighting on all fronts ended by October 26. The cease-fire did
not end the sporadic clashes along the cease-fire lines, nor did it
dissipate military tensions. With the third Army cut off and without any
means of resupply, it was effectively a hostage to the Israelis.
Israel received Kissinger's threat to support a UN withdrawal
resolution, but before they could respond, Egyptian national security
advisor Hafez Ismail sent Kissinger a stunning message—Egypt was willing
to enter into direct talks with the Israelis, provided that the Israelis
agree to allow nonmilitary supplies to reach their army and agree to a
complete cease-fire.
The talks took place on October 28, between Israeli Major General Aharon
Yariv and Egyptian Major General Muhammad al-Ghani al-Gamasy.
Ultimately, Kissinger brought the proposal to Sadat, who agreed almost
without debate. United Nations checkpoints were brought in to replace
Israeli checkpoints, nonmilitary supplies were allowed to pass, and
prisoners-of-war were to be exchanged. A summit in Geneva followed, and
ultimately, a peace agreement was worked out. On January 18, Israel
signed a pullback agreement to the west side of the canal, and the last
of their troops withdrew on March 5, 1974 (Rabinovich, 493).
Shuttle diplomacy by Henry Kissinger eventually produced a disengagement
agreement on May 31, 1974, based on exchange of prisoners-of-war,
Israeli withdrawal to the Purple Line and the establishment of a UN
buffer zone. The UN Disengagement and Observer Force (UNDOF) was
established as a peacekeeping force in the Golan.
Long-term effects of the war
The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab
and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the
aftermath of the 1948 war. .
For the Arabs (and Egyptians in particular), the psychological trauma of
their defeat in the Six-Day War had been healed. In many ways, it
allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals. However, given
that the war had started about as well as the Arabs could have wanted
but at the end they only made limited territorial gains in the Sinai
front, while Israel gained more territory on the Golan Heights than it
held before the war and also managed to gain a foothold on African soil
east of the canal helped convince many in the Arab world that it could
not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace movements.
The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following
their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become
complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning
of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had
thought they had military supremacy in the region.(Rabinovich, 497–498)
However, in time, they began to realize that "Reeling from a surprise
attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still unmobilized, and
confronted by staggering new battlefield realities, Israel's situation
was one that could readily bring strong nations to their knees. Yet,
within days, it had regained its footing and within less than two weeks
it was threatening both enemy capitals", "an achievement having few
historical parallels." (Rabinovich, 498). However, in Israel, the
casualty rate was high. Per capita, Israel suffered as many casualties
in 3 weeks of fighting as the United States did during almost a decade
of fighting in Vietnam.
In response to U.S. support of Israel, OAPEC nations, the Arab members
of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5% per
month on October 17, and threatened an embargo. President Nixon then
appealed to Congress on October 18th for $2.2 billion for arms shipments
to Israel. On October 20th, in the midst of the war, Saudi Arabia
declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by other oil
exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other states, causing
the 1973 energy crisis.
Any hope among the Egyptian government that this war would distract the
Egyptian population from internal grievances, were nullified by a
massive destructive anti-government food riot in Cairo with the slogan
"Yā batl al-`abūr, fēn al-futūr?" ("Hero of the crossing, where is our
breakfast?").
Fallout in Israel
A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the
war ended. It was led by Moti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the
northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to
be captured by the Egyptians (Rabinovich, 499). Anger against the
Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat,
President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry,
the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the
setbacks of the first few days (Rabinovich, 501).
The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2,
1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's
failings:
* IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal, after
the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the assessment
of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."
* Chief of Intelligence Eli Zeira and his deputy, Aryeh Shalev, were
recommended for dismissal.
* Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel
Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were
recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
* Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the
initial report to be relieved of active duty (Rabinovich, 502). He was
forced to leave the army after the publication of the Commission's final
report, on January 30, 1975, which found that "he failed to fulfill his
duties adequately, and bears much of the responsibility for the
dangerous situation in which our troops were caught."[5]
Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed
that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security failings,
not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside its
mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had cleared Meir and Dayan of all
responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's)
became more vociferous. (Rabinovich, 502)
Finally, on April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed
suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and
was turned down both times by Meir. Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most of
the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity (Rabinovich,
237), became head of the new Government, which was seated in June.
Camp David Accords
Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was
forced to step down in 1977. The right-wing Likud party, under the prime
ministership of Menachem Begin, won the elections that followed. This
was a historic change in the Israeli political landscape since for the
first time since Israel's founding, a coalition not led by the labour
party was in control of the government.
Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai, grew
frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In November 1977, he
took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab
leader to do so (and implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist).
The act jump-started the peace process. United States President Jimmy
Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to
negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17, 1978.
Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the
Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and
settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt and
a lasting peace.
Many in the Arab community were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel.
Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Until then, Egypt had been "at
the helm of the Arab world" (Karsh, 86).
Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years later, on October 6, 1981, while
attending a parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the
war. He was assassinated by Army members who were outraged at his
negotiations with Israel.
From:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Yom_Kippur_War
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